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Conclusion
Kentucky law, with the "expressions" in the principal case, has been
clarified and made consistent with the majority view' s as expressed by
the Courts in other states.' 9 It can now be said that one can rebut the
presumption of gratuity growing out of the family relationship upon
proof of either an express contract or an implied-in-fact contract. The
contract implied in law will not be allowed to rebut the presumption
of gratuity in such a situation unless the services are extraordinary or
non-personal in their nature.
Henry H. Dickinson
CmnrroRs iGrs-ATrAmvmNT LEN CnxATx ONLY FRoM Tnvm oF
AcruAL Lvy.- Pursuant to a creditor's suit, a summons and a gen-
eral order of attachment against the defendant's property were
issued and delivered to the constable for service and execution. Acting
under this authority, he attempted to attach the defendant's automobile
by merely handing him a copy of the summons and announcing that
he was attaching the car. It appears that the car was present, but that
he neither placed the writ upon it nor did any other overt act with
respect to it after the defendant objected to the attachment with some
vigor. Subsequently, the defendant drove the car daily for about
three months to and from his job which was located in another state,
until on one such trip the car was destroyed by fire while in that state.
The defendant appealed from a conviction of the crime of having
fraudulently and knowingly removed from Kentucky personal property
subject to a lien with intent to prevent it enforcement.'
HELD: Reversed with directions to set aside. Existence of a lien on
the property when it is removed from the state is an essential element
of the crime. The Court held that the general statutory rule is that an
' 8 Kentucky has always been in accord through its application of their "ex-
press contract", but the language as well as the application now tends to show
recovery can be had with either an express contract or a contract implied in fact.
197 A.L.R. 2d 23 (1949). Also see 58 Am. Jur. 523 (1948), footnote 16 and
cases cited therein.
' Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 434.210 which creates this offense provides that:
If any person shall fraudulently conceal, dispose of or knowingly
remove from this state any personal property on which there is at the
time a duly executed and acknowledged mortgage whether the same
be of record at said time or not, or any lien given under the statutory
laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, with intent to prevent or
hinder the enforcement of the lien . . . I he shall be guilty of the
larceny of the property ...
Hereinafter Ky. Rev. Stat. will' e referred to as "KRS".
RECENT CASEs
attachment lien is created only from the time of actual levy. In apply-
ing the rule to the case, the Court said that no lien had been created
on the car for lack of levy because the officer failed to take it into his
possession, as required in cases of personal property capable of manual
delivery. Thacker v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 284 S.W. 2d 325
(Ky. 1955).
The decision offers for comment at least two problems connected
with general orders of attachment issued prior to any adjudication of
the plaintiff's claim: (1) determination of the exact time at which a
lien is created, and (2) satisfying the legal requirements for a valid
levy. Reversal was probably a desirable result, but, on the first point,
the Court definitely departed from previous holdings, which clearly
have been to the effect that the time of creation of a lien is a matter
independent of the legal function, effect, and validity of the levy. On
the other hand, its statements regarding the officer's failure to satisfy
the legal requirements of a valid levy on personal property capable of
manual delivery seem to be in substantial accord with previous de-
cisions.
The remedy of attachment was unknown to and is in derogation of
the common law. Its origin is wholly statutory,2 and in Kentucky it is
available to a creditor under KRS 425.185. This statute entitles the
creditor, on specified grounds, to a general order of attachment against
his debtor's property as security in advance of any adjudication of his
claim. The creditor acquires a lien under the order by virtue of KRS
425.270, which provides that,
An attachment binds the defendant's property, in the county, which
might be seized under an execution against him, from the time of the
delivery of the order to the sheriff, in the same manner as an execu-
tion would bind it; and the lien of the plaintiff is completed upon any
property or demand of the defendant by executing the order upon it
in the manner directed... (emphasis added)
elsewhere in this chapter. The manner of executing the order is pre-
scribed in KRS 425.225, which requires the officer to proceed:
(1) Upon real property, by leaving with the occupant thereof, or, if
there be no occupant, in a conspicuous place thereon, a copy of
the order;
(2) Upon personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking it
into his custody and holding it subject to the order of the
court;...
Despite the fundamental difference in the two remedies, the Court
2 Pool v. Webster, 60 Ky. 278 (3 Metc. 1860); Union Bank and Trust Co.
v. Edwards, 137 SW 2d 44, at 348 (Ky. 1940).
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has treated 425.270 in the same manner as the execution statutes for
the purpose of determining the exact time at which a lien is created
on the debtor's property,4 and the cases clearly hold this time to be
from delivery of the writ into the officer's hands.5 Counsel argued in
Exchange Bank of Ky. v. Gillispies As'ee. that the latter clause of the
attachment statute, which says that "* . . the lien ... is completed...
by executing the order ... in the manner directed. . ." elsewhere, re-
quires an actual levy to create a lien. However the Court rejected
this argument, and held that delivery of the writ to the officer's hands
created the lien.6 Language to the same effect appears in the Daniels
v. Runyon opinion where the Court said that,
... the fact that the lien was not perfected until ... the attachment
was actually levied . .. can in no wise affect the validity of the at-
tachment lien...
which was created by delivery of the writ to the officer.7
Moreover, the Court has indicated elsewhere that the true func-
tion of a levy is not to create a lien, but that since the lien which is
created by delivery of the writ to the officer is general in nature, the
function of the levy is to relate the lien to particular property, and it
has the legal effect of rendering the lien more specific. 8
But another line of cases contains dicta to the contrary. For ex-
ample, in Bourne v. Hocker,9 the Court said that an attachment gives
no lien until levy. In that case a judgment creditor claimed a prior
lien by an unlevied execution writ delivered to an officer before an
actual levy by another officer under authority of an attachment writ.
3 KRS see. 426.120 gives the remedy of execution on a judgment debt and
provides that:
(1) An execution against property shall bind the estate of the de-
fendant only from the time of its delivery to the proper officer to
execute...
See 41 Ky. L. J. 464 for discussion of creation of liens under this provision.
4 Exchang Bank of Ky. v. Gillispie's Ass'ee., 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1817, 43 SW
401 (1897); see also, 41 Ky. L. J. 464, footnote 7 at 465 and case cited.
5Daniels v. Runyons, 164 Ky. 809, 175 SW 388 (1915); Exchange Bank of
Ky. v. Gillispie's Ass'ee., 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1317, 48 SW 401 (1897).
6 Supra, note 4.
7 Daniels v. Runyons, 164 Ky. 309 at 312, 175 SW 338 at 340 (1915).
8 C.T.C. Inv. Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corp., 58 F 2d 805 (ED Ky. 1931);
Addison v. Crow, 35 Ky. 271 at 274 (1887). It should be noted that KS see.
425.225 provides different procedures for levy on realty and personalty. It might
be argued that this offers a basis for distinguishing cases which involve the time
of creation of a lien. However, the Court rejects this idea in execution cases, holding
that the differentiation runs only to the determination of priority of liens between
competing creditors and to the rights of third persons. Since the statute and the
cases treat the time of creation of a lien of execution and a lien of attachment in
the same manner, it follows that the distinction would not be made in attachment
cases. See 41 Ky. L. J. 464 at 466, and cases cited.
950 Ky. 23 (11 B.Mon. 1850) at 25.
RECENT CASES
The Court held that despite the general rule that an execution lien is
created by delivery of the writ to the officer, if writs of competing
creditors are in the hands of distinct officers the first writ levied gives
the prior lien. The case does not make creation of the lien depend
upon levy, but merely stands for the proposition that the first lien re-
lated to particular property of the debtor by levy will be the first one
satisfied.
In the Thacker case, the Court cited other opinions as support for
its position that creation of a lien depends upon levy. Upon close
examination these decisions also appear to be rather weak authority
for the proposition. In Glass v. Alcorn,10 the officer seized 156 of 800
bags of seed which were owned by X, a non-resident corporation, but
stored in the named defendants' warehouse. The Court did not make
the lien dependent upon levy, but merely held that no lien was created
because the attachment was not sought or levied on the seed as the
property of the owner X, but as the property of named defendants A,
B, and C. The Court expressly stated that the question and the result
would have been different had the named defendants owned the prop-
erty sought to be subjected to the attachment order.
In Boiling v. Pikeville National Bank," the Court did say that de-
livery of an attachment writ to the officer does not create a lien, but
turned the case on a procedural point, and held only that a lower
court's mere recitation in its judgment that the writ was properly is-
sued, levied and returned, without more, is insufficient to create a lien
in favor of the plaintiff where the complete record before it failed to
show proper issuance, levy, or return. Lankford v. Sunshine Mining
Co.,12 turned on a similar point and the Court held again that it must
refuse to find a lien created where the record before it failed to show
any delivery of the writ to the officer, levy, or return. The plain im-
plication of the Court's language seems to be that it would have found
a lien created had the record indicated delivery of the writ to the
officer.
The Court could have reached the same result, in disposing of the
Thacker case, without departing from the rule laid down in its previous
holdings which resulted in the elevation of mere dicta to the full status
of stare decisis authority. The Court gave little or no attention to the
fact that the defendant was convicted under a statute which clearly
contemplates a permanent removal of the property from the State with
the fraudulent intent to prevent enforcement of the lien. Therefore,
10954 Ky. 16, 70 SW 2d 964 (1934).
11213 Ky. 317, 280 SW 1090 (1926).
12 287 Ky. 53, 151 SW 2d 402 (1940).
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even if the Court had held that delivery of this writ to the constable
created a lien on the defendant's property, including the automobile,
the conviction could have been reversed on the grounds that his act
of driving the car daily to and from his job, which was located out of
the State, for a period of about three months was merely incidental
to and a part of the ordinary and contemplated use of the property,
which certainly ought not constitute the criminal offense of larceny
under the statute.'13 In other words, the Court could have held merely
that the word lien for purposes of conviction under KRS 434.210 re-
ferred to a completed lien without going into the question of when
the defendant's property is bound under KRS 425.270.
After interpreting the attachment statute to require a levy to create
a lien, the Court held that this officer's conduct was insufficient to con-
stitute a valid levy because he failed to take possession of the car. As
pointed out above, the statute which prescribes the manner in which
the lien must be related to particular property by levy requires that
the officer execute the order upon personal property capable of manual
delivery by taking it into his custody. The general rule seems to be
that, under this provision, the officer must do something amounting to
a change of possession, or, as it is sometimes stated, he must do some
act with respect to the property which would make him liable as a
trespasser were he not protected by the authority of the writ.14
This officer did no overt act with respect to the defendant's car,
but, instead, he merely handed him a copy of the summons, 15 and an-
nounced that he was attaching the car. The Court has recognized that
an officer may satisfy the statute by a constructive change of possession,
i.e., under proper circumstances some conduct short of actual seizure
or manucaption will be treated as a change of possession.16 Thus, in
13 Pappas v. State, 135 Tenn. (8 Thompson) 499, 188 SW 52 (1916).
14 C.T.C. Inv. Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corp., 58 F 2d 305 (ED Ky. 1931)
at 315-316; Osborne v. Durbin, 301 Ky. 412, 192 SW 2d 198 at 200 (1946).
15 The constable's use of improper procedure, i.e., mere service of summons
might be explained by the fact that the Court, itself, has overlooked the distinction
drawn by the legislature in the time of creation of a lien by attachment in aid of
execution returned nulla bona under KRS sec. 426.381 (1933) which provides
that a lien may be created ".... by the service of summons . . .', and the time of
creation of a lien under attachment in advance of judgment under KRS sec.
425.185 which fixes the time at delivery of the writ to the officer. Peck v. Trail, 251
Ky. 377, 65 SW 2d 83 (1933), where a judgment creditor was seeking a lien by
attachment in aid of execution returned nulla bona, but the court applied the rules
for attachment in advance of judgment and held that no lien was created until
delivery of writ to the officer. Other cases hold that service of summons is suf-
ficient under KRS sec. 426.381; Murphy v. Cochran, 80 Ky. 239, 3 Ky. L. Rep. 727
(1882). Mere filing of the petition has been held to be enough. Trabne v. Con-
ners, 84 Ky. 283, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 288, 1 SW 470 (1886), and Caldwell v. Deposit
Bank, 109 Ky. 197, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 684, 58 SW 589 (1900).
16 Supra, note 14.
RECENT CASES
cases involving bulky chattels which are difficult or expensive to re-
move the statute does not apply, and the ceremonial touching or laying
on of either the hands or the writ is not always necessary, but it is
enough, in such cases, that the property is present so that he might
have touched or removed it, if he unequivocally indicated the levy by
word or deed.'
7
The main reason for requiring seizure or removal of any property
is to protect innocent third persons who may subsequently deal with
the defendant. 18 Therefore, when the rights of the defendant only are
in question no great strictness of form ought to be required where the
nature of the property itself is such as to make actual seizure or re-
moval difficult or expensive. 19 Conversely, it would seem that the
Court correctly construed the seizure provision strictly in favor of
Thacker,20 by requiring more than mere service of summons and an-
nouncement, because the nature of this property, an automobile, is
such as to readily lend itself to seizure and removal. Although the
Court made no reference to the idea, the correctness of this aspect of
the decision finds additional support in the modem analysis of "pos-
session" as a relative factual concept, which may mean one thing in
deciding whether a person has acquired a titular interest but quite a
different thing in determining the guilt or innocence of a person ac-
cu'sed of crime.2 1
Clarity and precision in the rules which govern the procedure to
be followed by attaching creditors and which define the proper func-
tion and legal effect of each step in this procedure are highly desirable
from the standpoint of determining the respective rights of both
debtors and creditors. It might be argued that the real basis of the
Thacker decision is an underlying social policy which disfavors the
imposition of criminal penalties upon debtors as a means of aiding
enforcement of creditors claims, and that the only legal significance
of the opinion is simply that the defendant was immune from prosecu-
tion under the circumstances. However, the Court gave no indication
that it was so influenced, and, as pointed out above, could have
reached the same result by disposing of the case with a strict construc-
tion of the criminal statute. Therefore, it must be concluded that, in
turning the case on a construction of the attachment statute and hold-
17 Hill v. Harris, 49 Ky. 120 (10 B.Mon. 1849); Osborne v. Durbin, supra,
note 14. Accord: 27 Tex. Jur. 476; 4 Am. Jur. 878.
18 4 Am. Jur. 880; Waples, Attachment and Garnishment, p. 175.
19 Osborne v. Durkin, 301 Ky. 412, 192 SW 2d 198 (1946); Hill v. Harris,
49 Ky. 120 (10 B.Mon. 1849).
20 Union Bank and Trust Co. v. Edwards, 281 Ky. 693, 137 SW 2d 344
(1940).
21 Brown, Personal Property, pp. 19-20.
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ing that the creation of a lien depends upon levy, the Court unfortu-
nately departed from previously established notions as to the proper
function and legal effect of a levy, and in doing so, introduced an ele-
ment of uncertainty into an otherwise well settled rule affecting the
rights of debtors and creditors in attachment proceedings under this
statute.
William E. Bivin
CPIInNAL LAW-ULLMANN V. UNITED STATES-GRANT OF ImmuNInY
IN LiEu OF P RVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRRV=ATION*-A brief historical
preface to Ullmann v. United States1 would seem helpful, if not es-
sential, to a full appreciation of the significance of this decision. The
Ullmann case is the culmination of a great deal of legislative and
juristic effort toward a solution of the fundamental problems arising
when the need for congressional investigation conflicts with the right
of witnesses called pursuant to such investigation to remain silent on
the grounds that their testimony will incriminate them. It is clear that
the privilege to remain silent as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
can be replaced by a grant of immunity by Congress. The major
problem in the past with regard to the granting of immunity in lieu of
the privilege has evolved around the extent of protection necessary in
order for the immunity to be considered equal to the constitutional
privilege to say nothing. The first immunity statute was enacted by
Congress in 1857,2 immunizing witnesses from all future prosecution.
Due to the abuse of the statute and the "immunity baths" which fol-
lowed it, it was replaced in 1862 by a statute which merely immunized
the witness from the future use of his testimony.3 The Supreme Court
in Cbunselman v. Hitchcock4 held an identically worded statute un-
constitutional as failing to furnish protection equating the privilege to
remain silent. In 1896 the Supreme Court considered a statute which
provided complete immunity from prosecution to witnesses appearing
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. This case was Brown v.
Walker0 and that decision was held to be controlling in the instant
* Ed. note. This comment is offered as a follow-up to the symposium on
self-incrimination which appeared in volume 44 of the Kentucky Law Journal, and
should be read in conjunction with that extensive treatment of the subject.
1850 U.S. 422, 76 S. Ct. 497 (1956).
2 11 Stat. 156 (1857), as cited in Adams v. Maryland, 847 U.S. 179 n. 2
(1954).
3 12 Stat. 83 (1862), as cited by King Immunity for Witnesses: An In-
ventory of Caveats, 40 A.B.A.J. 877 n. 1 (19545.
4142 U.S. 547 (1892).
5 15 Stat. 87 (1868), as cited in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 555
(1892).
6 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
